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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 890684-CA 
v. : 
GEORGE EDWARD HARGRAVES, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional guilty plea to two 
second degree felonies in the Second District Court. This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err by ruling that the search 
of defendant's vehicle was justified by voluntary consent that 
was not obtained by exploitation of an allegedly illegal 
detention? On appeal, a correction of error standard is applied 
to the trial court's legal conclusions. State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 
1989) (citing Oates v. Chavez, 7490 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. IVt 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990); and 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to 
distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990). Defendant moved to suppress 
the evidence before the Honorable David E. Roth, Second District 
Court Judge. Judge Roth denied the motion and defendant entered 
a conditional guilty plea (T2. 20). Judge Roth reduced count 
two to a second degree felony and sentenced defendant to two 
terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 49, 
50). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 27, 1989, Highway Patrol Trooper Spiegel 
2 
was traveling south on Harrison Blvd. in Ogden (T. 6). 
Defendant and a female companion were also traveling South on 
Harrison Blvd. after pulling out of a gas station (T. 7, 42). 
They appeared nervous when they noticed Trooper Spiegel driving 
behind them (T. 8). Defendant looked back at Spiegel two or 
three times (T. 9). Spiegel called to check the vehicle plates 
through NCIC at 12:54 p.m. and found that the vehicle was not 
reported stolen (T. 10). Because Spiegel noticed during the time 
he was following the car that the windshield was cracked, Spiegel 
T2 is the transcript containing the hearings of April 
19, 1989 and April 24, 1989. 
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T is the transcript containing the hearings of April 
7, 1989 and April 14, 1989. 
stopped them at 12:56 p.m. (T. 11, 15, 33-34). 
When Spiegel asked the driver, Shelly Hall, for her 
license and vehicle registration, she stated that her license was 
buried inside her suitcase in the trunk and handed him the 
registration (T. 18, 44). After a short conversation with 
defendant, Hall told Spiegel that she had lost her driver's 
license (T. 18, 44). At that point, Spiegel called for backup 
(T. 18). Trooper Kodele arrived seven minutes after Spiegel 
stopped the vehicle (T. 15). Another trooper, Home, arrived 
sometime after Kodele but before 1:30 p.m. (T. 16). 
An NCIC check revealed that Hall was wanted in Oregon 
on a dangerous drug violation (T. 32). Hall was arrested because 
of the outstanding warrant (T. 33). Spiegel also issued a "fix-
it" citation for the broken windshield (T. 32). 
The troopers also discovered that the Texas 
registration presented to them was for a vehicle other than the 
one that the plates were attached to (T. 25). They checked with 
Texas to discover the explanation for the discrepancy and would 
not have allowed defendant to leave the scene until the problem 
was cleared up (T. 25). 
During the time that defendant and Hall were detained 
at the scene, Trooper Spiegel asked defendant about three times 
what it was that he did not want the officers to see inside the 
3 
trunk (T. 17, 45). Defendant said there was nothing there, 
offered Spiegel his keys and told him to look inside (T. 17, 72). 
3 
The trial court could not determine whether defendant 
was in custody during this time and, thus, assumed that he was in 
custody in deciding whether to suppress the evidence (T2. 7). 
Spiegel looked inside the trunk but had found nothing when other 
officers arrived on the scene (T. 24). 
When Sgt. Bush arrived at 1:30 p.m. while Spiegel was 
looking through the trunk, he suggested that they obtain a 
written consent from defendant for the search (T. 24, 29, 102). 
Bush instructed Spiegel, in defendant's presence, to stop 
searching until defendant signed the form (T. 29, 102, 106). 
Bush turned to defendant and asked if defendant would sign the 
form (T. 30). Defendant agreed to sign it (T. 30). While they 
were filling out the form, defendant told Bush that he was on 
probation for a drug violation in Oregon (T. 30). Defendant 
signed the written consent form (T. 67, 113). Discovered in the 
vehicle was approximately one pound of cocaine and over twenty 
pounds of marijuana hidden in the back of the front seat. 
Prior to his arrest for possession of the drugs, 
defendant told the officers he was diabetic (T. 19, 111). After 
he was arrested, defendant said he was going into shock and 
needed to take his insulin shot (T. 19, 31, 156). He told Bush 
that the shot was due at 3:30 p.m. (T. 113). Paramedics were 
called to the scene and they arrived at 2:42 p.m. (T. 124). 
Defendant told them he needed his insulin at 3:00 p.m. (T. 125). 
They tested defendant's blood sugar and found the level to be 175 
which is high-normal for a diabetic (T. 127-28). Defendant 
scored a 15, the highest score, on the Glasgow Coma Scale which 
meant he was well-oriented (T. 129). The paramedics recommended 
transporting defendant to the hospital for evaluation since they 
do not administer insulin and it was nearly time for defendant's 
injection (T. 126, 131). The emergency room physician found 
defendant's claim of insulin shock contradictory to his request 
for an injection (T. 138). Insulin shock indicates there is too 
much insulin in the body and a person experiencing this would not 
want more insulin (T. 138). 
The hospital reading of defendant's blood sugar level 
was 46 — lower than the normal range of 80-120 (R. 139-41). 
Blood sugar levels can drop precipitously (T. 142). Defendant 
administered insulin to himself about 15 minutes before his blood 
was drawn for the glucose test (T. 159-60). 
Defendant claimed that at the time he consented to the 
search, 1:30 p.m., he was experiencing insulin shock and was 
disoriented and confused (T. 53-55, 56). The officers, paramedic 
and doctor who observed defendant all felt that he appeared 
normal, not confused (T. 73, 77, 79-80, 81-82, 83, 106, 125, 128, 
132, 138, 142-48, 157-59, 164). Based upon this testimony, the 
court found defendant was coherent, lucid and articulate at the 
time of his consent (T2. 9). Judge Roth went on to find that 
defendant's consent was voluntary (T2. 10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Regardless of whether there was an unlawful stop of 
defendant's vehicle, the search in this case was justified by 
defendant's verbal and written consent. Contrary to defendant's 
claim, his consent was voluntary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH 
Defendant asserts that the judge erred in finding that 
he voluntarily consented to the search of his car. On appeal of 
a suppression ruling, this Court applies a correction of error 
standard to the trial court's conclusions of law. State v. 
Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, 
P.2d (Utah 1989) (citing Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 
(Utah 1988)). The clearly erroneous standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a) is applied to the judge's findings of fact. State v. 
Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (Utah 1990). Defendant does 
not challenge the court's findings of fact, rather, he challenges 
the court's legal conclusion that the consent was voluntary. As 
defendant points out, the trial court did not determine whether 
the initial stop of defendant was pretextual because the court 
viewed consent as the only issue (T. 165, 169-70). Thus, this 
Court need not decide whether the initial stop was pretextual. 
Warrantless searches that are not justified by some 
recognized exception the warrant requirement are per se 
unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional. State v. Arroyo, 
137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15 (Utah June 28, 1990). One exception to 
the warrant requirement is voluntary consent. j[d. The State 
bears the burden to prove that consent was voluntary. Id. 
Voluntary consent to search following a pretextual stop 
renders evidence discovered in the search admissible so long as 
the consent was not produced by police exploitation of the 
pretextual stop. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. In this 
case, the trial court ruled that defendant voluntarily consented 
to the search of his car. Defendant does not claim on appeal 
that there was exploitation of any primary illegality, he simply 
asserts that the court erred in finding that the consent was 
voluntary. 
Judge Roth's conclusion that defendant consented 
voluntarily was supported by overwhelming evidence from the 
officers at the scene. Defendant argued that his consent was 
involuntary because he was confused as the result of insulin 
shock. However, all of the officers who testified indicated that 
defendant appeared normal to them (T. 73, 77, 79-80, 81-82, 83, 
106, 157-59, 164). The paramedic who responded to the scene when 
defendant said he was experiencing insulin shock found that 
defendant appeared normal and scored the highest possible score 
on a test designed to determine his degree of alertness (T. 125, 
128, 129, 132, 138). The emergency room doctor who examined 
defendant stated that defendant seemed normal and not generally 
confused (T. 142, 144, 145). 
Furthermore, the circumstances of the stop itself were 
not coercive as defendant claimed. There were four officers 
present at the time defendant was asked to sign the written 
consent form at 1:30 (T. 24). Defendant stated there were only 
three officers there (T. 67). One of the officers was seated in 
a patrol car with defendant's companion who had been arrested on 
a warrant out of Oregon (T. 27, 79). They did not surround 
defendant or tell him that he must sign the consent form (T. 30, 
79-81, 107, 154). Defendant was not handcuffed or restrained (T. 
108). There was no show of force (T. 110). When defendant 
requested a Seven-Up from his car because of his dry mouth 
associated with diabetes, it was given to him (T. 31, 111-12). 
When defendant asked for his coat from the car, it was given to 
him (T. 111). Based upon this evidence, Judge Roth was justified 
in finding that defendant's consent was voluntary under the test 
articulated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and 
relied upon by defendant. There was clear and positive testimony 
that the consent was voluntary and given without duress or 
coercion, express or implied. Consequently, the court correctly 
refused to suppress the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / day of August, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
-8-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Martin V. Gravis, Attorney for Appellant, 2568 Washington Blvd., 
Suite 203, Ogden, Utah 84401, this /v day of August, 1990. 
